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# Conspiracism on social media: An agenda melding of group-mediated deceptions

## ABSTRACT

*This study examines students' social media interactions in relation to their subcultural explorations of a conspiratorial nature. A sample of 476 students from four European universities participated in a survey about conspiracy theories in social media group discussions. In the survey, we examined various social and media factors in relation to students' beliefs in conspiracy theories. The results of this exploratory study reveal that students treat social media as news sources; furthermore, they trust social media more than traditional mass media. The study reveals demographic, personal and technological factors that encourage a mediated conspiratorial discourse.*

## KEYWORDS

agenda melding  
conspiracism  
group-mediated  
deceptions  
social media  
vaccination  
chemtrails

## INTRODUCTION

On 30 October 1938, the famous actor, radio broadcaster and cinema director Orson Welles became responsible for a case of mass hysteria. A radio broadcast prepared as a harmless Halloween prank turned into a mass nightmare for thousands of people, who really believed that an alien invasion from Mars was underway during that peculiar evening. According to Lowery and DeFleur (1995), many frightened listeners tried to make sense of conflicting information, ran for shelter in churches and other public buildings, whereas many got involved in car accidents while they were fleeing New York City and the surrounding areas.

This case of mass hysteria provided researchers with a unique opportunity to unravel the mechanisms of mass fear. This task was undertaken by Hadley Cantril (1940), who wrote an extensive report on the incident. As we revisit Cantril's findings almost 80 years later, there are some striking resemblances between the early days of radio and the early days of social media. Indeed, there is evidence that people today increasingly use social media as news sources (Hladík and Štetka 2017; Nielsen and Schroder 2014). Recognizing the capacity of social media to provide diverse content, including news, many consumers treat social media as news gatekeepers, choosing to receive their news from these platforms (de Zúñiga et al. 2012).

Furthermore, as in the 1930s, there is a high level of insecurity in the world today. Instability, populist politics, environmental problems, economic issues, conflict and intense movements of populations have marked the advent of the twenty-first century. In parallel to technological developments during the early days of radio, current technological advances have empowered users in terms of navigation, easy access to information and the degree of interactivity. The critical ability of modern social media users attracts the attention of researchers in the same manner, as in the case of those early radio listeners. In a further parallel of the early days of radio, a significant number of social media users today cannot distinguish between reality and a hoax (Balmas 2014). Cantril (1940) points out that only one in ten listeners fell for Welles' hoax. However, even the minority of listeners constituted a non-negligible portion of the audience.

In this article, we look at a particular segment of users as we examine an agenda melding of deceptions or delusions, in social media settings. The terms 'deception' and 'delusion' are not always treated in the same manner by specialists. They are clearly slippery terms that require a great deal of caution as we examine these social phenomena. The central idea conveyed by both terms implies a false understanding or a failure to make sense of one's natural or social environment. For example, Cantril (1940) was convinced that Welles' radio listeners were deceived or deluded because they failed to distinguish between reality and fiction. Today, we face similar challenges in regard to what is real or fake. Contemporary groups promoting arguments for a 'flat earth' attract significant numbers of like-minded participants while disputing governmental evidence against their views (Lewis 2016).

We are aware of the difficulty of drawing a line between what is real and what is fake in media settings. What we describe in this article as deceptions or delusions might be approached by certain bloggers or social media contributors as 'alternative understandings' or 'alternative facts'. Following in Cantril's footsteps and while recognizing the profound difficulties in approaching those terms, the present study investigates collective deceptions. We use the terms

‘deception’ and ‘delusion’ interchangeably. We certainly do not argue that group deceptions are caused by media technologies. While resisting deterministic perspectives, we argue that social media environments constitute suitable hybrid media contexts where individual beliefs meld with group beliefs. Thereby, collective deceptions or delusions are scrutinized as social phenomena, examined in conjunction with digital media developments. We assume that social media platforms aid the melding process of individual or group agendas (Shaw et al. 2019). In today’s world, social media provide an array of opportunities for the empowerment of individuals, groups, organizations, institutions and governments. Thereby, we assess an agenda melding process as individuals discover other like-minded individuals while engaging in discussions around their common interests.

In this project, we focus on social media interactions of a conspiratorial nature. There is widespread evidence emerging from mainstream as well as alternative media that certain segments of social media users consume content of questionable validity, without scrutinizing its origin, coherence and logical foundation (Stempel et al. 2007). While recognizing the difficulties we encounter in evaluating such content, we proceed to present various problems that challenge those worldviews.

## THE CURRENT PROJECT

The research presented in this article assumes that many conspiracy theories gain ground online as individuals search for content, exchange information, engage in discussions and reinforce each other’s pre-existing beliefs. Easy access, navigation, participation and exchange of content among users provide new opportunities for strengthening one’s beliefs while attracting like-minded individuals in various digital forums. The literature indicates that group-mediated deceptions might influence perceptions and behaviours. At the behavioural level, individuals might influence friends, families and peers. One noted example of group-mediated deceptions or delusions involves vaccination. Kata (2010) presents such a case of social media discussions among doubtful parents leading to reinforcement of pre-existing fears and emotional reactions. Those discussions are rarely based on solid medical evidence. And, though physicians agree that no medication is totally side-effect free, the benefits of vaccination have been observed worldwide, as diseases that plagued entire populations in previous time periods have been eradicated. However, a conspiratorial discourse that advances an anti-vaccination rhetoric gains attention around the world. Social media has been at the centre of this ‘anti-vaccination movement’. According to Kata, ‘these social groups exert considerable pressure on vaccination decisions by creating a “local vaccination culture”’ (2010: 1709).

The work presented in this article explores different social, technological and personal factors that seem to be related to conspiratorial beliefs. For example, the widespread belief that conspirators spray toxic substances on unsuspecting citizens with the aim of keeping them under control has gained users’ attention on different social media platforms (Tingley and Wagner 2017). A significant number of groups or communities discuss the ‘chemtrails’ issue while circulating different pieces of ‘information’ – including audiovisual evidence – that supposedly advances this particular belief. However, additional evidence is generated with other popular conspiracies dealing with vaccinations, the concealed cure-for-cancer conspiracy and the 9/11 attacks

in the United States. Based on the literature, we pose the following exploratory research questions to assess an agenda melding of group-mediated deceptions:

RQ1: To what extent do students engage in discussions of a conspiratorial nature on social media?

RQ2: What media and social factors are related to students' conspiratorial beliefs?

There are several assumptions underlying these exploratory questions. We assume that students devote significant attention to alternative content as conspiracy theories have attracted wide attention in recent years. Furthermore, we argue that of central importance to this work is the idea that social media has gained users' trust and are increasingly perceived as more reliable and trustworthy sources of 'news' than mainstream, mass media. There is a wide-spread discussion among scholars and the general public alike that people tend to seek information and belief reinforcement from like-minded peers who share their beliefs on social media platforms. We assume that as people participate in mediated group discussions about conspiratorial content, there will be a higher probability of users' adherence to conspiratorial perceptions. This assumption does not imply a causal relationship between participation and belief formation. In fact, the literature indicates that the opposite might be true – individuals who are already predisposed towards conspiracism seek other like-minded individuals in social media settings (Bessi et al. 2014).

## CONSPIRACISM IN DIGITAL SETTINGS

Scholars agree that conspiracism increasingly becomes a mainstream paradigm through which many individuals try to make sense of the world. In this project, we differentiate between conspiracies and conspiracism. The former refers to actual plans designed and, in some cases, executed by conspiring actors. We do not dispute the existence of actual conspiracies. By conspiracism, on the other hand, we refer to people's tendencies to explain world phenomena as the outcomes of conspiracies. Conspiracy theories have maintained the interest of people for centuries because of their enticing narratives clouded by mystery and suspense. However, in the twenty-first century, the advent of digital media has brought conspiracism to the forefront of mediated discussions (Kata 2010). Most scholars recognize some common threads in the definitions they provide. Aaronovitch describes people's inclinations towards conspiracism as 'the attribution of deliberate agency to something that is more likely to be accidental or unintended, therefore, it is the unnecessary assumption of conspiracy when other explanations are more probable' (2009: 29). Sunstein and Vermeule (2009) view conspiracies as a consistent effort of ordinary individuals to attribute what happens in the world to powerful people or entities. Brotherton (2013) describes conspiracies as popular stories that gain people's attention, for which there is no available evidence while, at the same time, they cannot be falsified either. Various cases of popular conspiracy theories can be traced in the literature, such as the 9/11 terrorist attacks (Stempel et al. 2007), the death of Princess Diana (Douglas and Sutton 2008), the vaccines (Kata 2010) and the chemtrails notions – some of them promoted very effectively by Hollywood blockbuster movies. Along with some newer theories, there are also traditional conspiracies such as the existence of the Illuminati,

the Rothschilds' activities and JFK's assassination. It is also interesting to note that according to recent analysis of survey data, 'half of the American public consistently endorses at least one conspiracy theory' (Oliver and Wood 2014: 952).

Scientists have treated conspiracy theorists as individuals, displaying signs of irrational thinking. Pipes describes conspiracism as a 'vortex of illusion and superstition' (1997: 173). Social psychologists recognize a mode of conceptualization known as 'conspiracist ideation' (Swami et al. 2011). Stempel et al. (2007) refer to a similar construct of social structuring of beliefs. At the individual level, numerous studies recognize personality traits that are prone to conspiracism, such as 'low self-efficacy, lack of self-esteem, dissatisfaction with life, and anxiety, both as a temporary state, or a stable individual difference' (Brotherton and Eser 2015: 1).

Postmodernism has provided a fertile ground for the proliferation of conspiracism. Although conspiratorial beliefs can be traced in medieval Europe, Aupers (2012) argues that a conspiracy-oriented discourse has been transformed over recent decades. Since the 1960s, narratives changed as they shifted from a focus on 'others' – such as the Jews – towards institutions, thereby discovering internal enemies. On different occasions, those internal enemies might consist of governments, corporations and institutions. Knight (2000) argues that popular conspiracism has gained people's attention, becoming almost a form of obsession. People become suspicious as they look for conspiring agents in all social avenues of life. Wood et al. (2012) explain conspiracism as a preoccupation of mistrusting any type of information that originates from 'official' sources. In this frame, they note that a 'conspiracy belief is not about believing in particular alternative theories, but in disbelieving in whatever the official story is' (Wood and Douglas 2015: 1–2). Tending to mistrust official sources (including mainstream mass media), people constantly seek for alternative explanations as more plausible forms of interpretation. This social tendency to seek alternative versions of interpretation gains momentum among various like-minded citizens, while creating a suitable environment for the promotion of alternative stories touted as 'valid information'.

Interestingly, this atmosphere of suspicion and mistrust can be attributed to the nature of scientific discourse. For decades, university students have been taught to be suspicious of and to express their doubts about established teachings. Giddens (1992) points out that science depends on proofs and on doubts simultaneously. As scepticism was promoted in university classrooms throughout the twentieth century and while postmodernists claim that 'truths' are social constructs based on ideologies and power negotiations, scientific knowledge has reached the point where it is no longer considered the only form of knowledge or the one superior to other forms of inquiries. In fact, scientific knowledge has been gradually delegitimized and scientific 'truth' has ceased to be a credible discourse. In this context, 'conspiracy theories are cultural responses to these developments – they are strategies to rationalize anxieties by developing explicable accounts for seemingly inexplicable forces' (Aupers 2012: 28). Scientists do not argue against the very existence of conspiracies. However, they recognize the difference between fact-based conspiracies and alternative theories, widely circulated online. Social media and the Internet generally rendered conspiracism universally accessible. As people's distrust of established institutions increased, the dissemination of unsubstantiated information proliferated globally. Rojecki and Meraz point

out that ‘facts mingle with half-truths and untruths to create factitious informational blends’ (2016: 25). Popular disbelief is further fuelled by media scandals witnessed by people worldwide. When people do not trust mass media, alternative agendas gain their attention. The Internet has emerged as the ideal setting for ordinary individuals to expound their personal beliefs without any hindrance, and without feeling the need to prove anything through validated processes of verification. This hybrid form of ‘information’ – partly personal, partly mediated – leads to new waves of misinformation. In this environment, conspiracy theories grow in a fertile ground as people constantly express their doubts while offering their own versions of reality. Stempel et al. show that ‘reading daily newspapers and newspaper websites are negatively associated with believing that the government assisted the 9/11 attacks, and getting news from blogs and occasionally reading a tabloid are positively associated with this conspiracy’ (2007: 363).

Although media scholars dispute audience’s exclusive dependence on social media as the primary sources of information, while showing significant patterns of content distribution that involve both mainstream media and alternative online sources, certain segments bound by distinct demographic and cultural characteristics deserve a careful inquiry in regard to their choices for content consumption. Furthermore, Nelson and Taneja (2018) suggest that fake news audiences are in fact small, while mainstream media sources retain the power to influence public political agendas. In fact, a significant body of scholarly evidence points to the same direction in terms of fake news consumption that in turn leads to certain perceptions of political realities (Allcott and Gentzkow 2017). Drawing from this evidence, this study looks at smaller groups and their appetites for content.

When dealing with subcultural groups, the focus of scholarly inquiries is, by definition, confined within particular segments. As has been shown, conspiracists do not rely on standard evidence to understand social events; they rely on narratives to convey their information. For example, Guildry et al. (2015) point to the difference between statistical evidence and narratives. People pay attention to narratives while devaluing empirical presentations. Furthermore, people engage evidence by employing a diverse array of available interpretive tools. Scientists note that users tend to form communities of interest, seeking primarily belief reinforcement and personal validation. Bessi et al. (2014) present evidence for isolated clusters of individuals, while polarized groups gather together seeking content that satisfies pre-existing beliefs. Individuals remain close to their community, seeking information that reinforces their pre-existing views.

Researchers acknowledge various personality traits that are prone to conspiracism. Although beyond the scope of the current project, we should point out that powerlessness, low self-esteem, isolation and alienation along with anger, hostility and disappointment have been scrutinized in relation to conspiracy theories and there has been evidence to support the link (Stempel et al. 2007; Abalakina-Paap et al. 1999; Swami and Furnham 2012). As Sunstein and Vermeule state, ‘when people are especially angry or fearful, they are more likely to focus on particular sorts of rumors and to spread them to others’ (2009: 216). Van Zoonen (2012) argues that political orientation and populism, in particular, should be examined as predictors of conspiracism. The emergence of populist rhetoric (which is known for its simplicity and its anti-elitism) unifies people under common general messages – freedom, morality, welfare, justice, etc. Furthermore, uncertainty resulting from the current

conditions leads people to focus their attention on the morality of authorities' actions and this influences belief or disbelief in a conspiracy (Van Prooijen and Jostmann 2013). Thus, insecurity, anxiety and people's need for control are closely related to their tendency to believe in conspiracy theories (Van Prooijen and Acker 2015; Grzesiak-Feldman 2013; Goertzel 1994).

## **SOCIAL MEDIA AGENDA MELDING OF CONSPIRACIES**

Agenda setting theory evolved as one of the most significant paradigms dealing primarily with the transfer of salience from the media to the public (McCombs and Shaw 1972). For almost fifty years, mainstream mass media have been recognized as the dominant agenda setters in western liberal democracies. The capacity of mass media to establish common themes while attributing prominence to news stories, political personalities or organizations has been recognized as a consensus building process (McCombs 2014). For years, mass media functioned as agenda setters and moderators of public discussions. Citizens and consumers recognized those significant issues while ignoring subcultural themes and discussions. Although mass media still establish dominant agendas for societies, various alternative media promote segmented agendas while competing against mainstream sources. Thereby, the agenda setting phenomenon has expanded further, while encompassing individual, group or even community agendas. In some cases, vertical and horizontal media agendas converge while influencing one another (McCombs et al. 2014; Shaw et al. 2019).

However, the current project deals with segmented agendas promoted by individuals as they seek support and validation of their beliefs in environments of virtual communities. Although, this agenda melding involves also mainstream, mass media processes, there is evidence that social media platforms empower lay people in establishing the salience of conspiratorial themes. Furthermore, like-minded individuals find one another in platforms promoting segmented interests. According to Ragas and Roberts,

the agenda melding hypothesis posits when individuals join groups, they 'meld' their individual agendas with the agendas of the group. Groups and communities represent a 'collected agenda of issues' and 'one joins a group by adopting an agenda'. While agenda melding marks a departure from traditional agenda setting, the transfer of salience remains at its theoretical core and provides parsimony.

(2009: 46)

Although agenda setting in its traditional sense examines public agendas as a result of established media agendas, agenda melding examines individual and group agendas converging with one another as individuals find the harmony of beliefs in group-mediated discourses. As early as 1999, the founding fathers of agenda setting theory clearly foresaw the evolution of the paradigm as web technologies shifted people's information-seeking routines. Shaw et al. observed: 'the mass media, while important, are only one of the many significant media, including people, through which we find comfortable social or public agendas with which to meld. All media are about relationships' (1999: 3). The current project adopts a similar rationale. Accepting conspiracism as a personal agenda should be investigated as an individual effort to explain the world. However, individuals pursue explanations in communities, not in



isolation. People seek validation from like-minded individuals. Shaw et al. explain

that some force in individuals drives them to seek and adopt group or community agendas in order to belong, and that not to do so is highly uncomfortable. Agenda setting is an important part – but only an intervening part – of this social process of agenda melding.

(1999: 3)

Agenda melding theory recognizes that individuals with established predispositions towards certain beliefs seek validation and reinforcement in groups or communities of like-minded individuals. In those environments, subcultural agendas meld with one another, creating ideological bonds among community members.

## **METHOD**

A survey was conducted among students from four public European universities in Greece, Cyprus and the United Kingdom. Entire classes of undergraduate students from selected modules participated in the survey. Questionnaires were distributed on different campuses during the fall of 2016 by a team of researchers working together to administer the survey. A sample of 476 students filled out the questionnaire. Because in strictly statistical terms, the sample was not randomly selected, we are hesitant about generalizing these results to other student populations. The sample is primarily composed of undergraduate students lacking the demographic diversity of a random sample. However, it represents a generation of millennials, a distinct cohort of people that grew up with technology, and, thereby, allows us to draw some meaningful preliminary conclusions, which can be followed up by future studies. From all 476 students participating in the survey, 70.4 per cent represent two universities from Greece, 15.3 per cent represent a Cypriot university and 14.3 per cent represent a university in the United Kingdom. The students surveyed come from three countries that have experienced significant social, political and economic changes. Since 2010, Greece has dealt with a significant economic crisis and accepted major austerity measures cutting public spending while experiencing a rapid rise in unemployment. Cyprus dealt with a banking crisis which led to an unprecedented bail-out programme, resulting in a significant loss of people's savings. In a referendum about the country's relationship with the European Union, the British people voted in favour of exiting the Union, popularly known as Brexit. The outcome of the British referendum has initiated a period of political turbulence in the context of the European Union. All three countries represented in the sample – and, arguably, many other western states – display signs of political polarization, giving rise to parties of the far right or the far left while promoting dubious, populist personalities at the core of political discourse.

The sample is composed of 42.3 per cent male and 57.7 per cent female students. There are three primary nationalities represented in the sample: Greek, Cypriot and British, while eight students indicated that they were not nationals of the participating institutions' countries. Furthermore, there are some variations in terms of income among respondents, a finding that is consistent with income per capita records, which are officially available for each country. The vast majority of respondents are undergraduate students



(99.2 per cent). The study is focused on students as a distinct group of respondents who are expected to assume future leadership positions in various sectors of society while influencing national policies and future initiatives in different European countries. At the same time, they are considered as inexperienced consumers of news striving to get a sense of orientation in an increasingly complex world. Their critical and analytical skills are in development since they have not completed their undergraduate education. Though this is not a random sample in the strict sense, it does represent youth segments with a significant potential for influencing others.

## QUESTIONNAIRE DESIGN

The questionnaire included categorical items as well as ordinal/interval variables designed to collect demographic information and to assess participation in various groups/communities. The Likert scale was used for more elaborate measures of attitudes and beliefs. To assess the reliability of the instrument, we measured Cronbach's Alpha, which registered at acceptable levels (0.758). The questionnaire included demographic, ideological and personality-related items along with questions about media use, online behaviour and students' prior conspiratorial framework (see questionnaire in Appendix 1). The combination of those categories of questions was deemed appropriate for our design, as we try to detect connections between students' online activity on social media platforms and their conspiratorial beliefs and inclinations. To design those questions, we drew from Eurobarometer, an established public opinion survey conducted in the context of the European Union. Many of our items, including the scales used, were adapted directly from previous Eurobarometer public opinion polls.

## ANALYSIS OF THE DATA

We used both descriptive and inferential statistics to analyse the data. Diagnostic tests were used to assess the robustness of our findings. For example, we checked our data for the independence of observations, multicollinearity and heteroscedasticity. We designed a regression model to assess the factors that are significantly related to students' agreement with conspiratorial beliefs. Our primary premise is that social media group discussions with a strong emphasis on conspiracies should be treated as the primary independent variables while various other factors should be scrutinized as additional control variables. In investigating these factors, given that the mentioned *overall\_agreement* variable is a dummy variable, we cannot apply the method of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) due to some limitations. First, by using OLS we assume that the probability of our dependent variable moves linearly with the value of the explanatory variable and second, there is no guarantee that the estimated probability values from the OLS will lie within the [0,1] interval. In addition, OLS assumes continuous dependent variable and not binary. Logit and Probit models can be used instead. These models were developed with a binary dependent variable in mind. Initially we tried both the Logit and the Probit models. However, the results remained the same – both qualitatively and quantitatively. Thereby, we proceeded with the marginal effects approach. The latter yielded a single value for a one per cent change in the explanatory variable on the probability that the dependent variable takes the value of one. We used the Marginal Effects at the mean (MEM) of all regressors.

## RESULTS

To assess influences on conspiratorial beliefs, we used several measures of both descriptive and inferential nature. Students indicated that they spend a lot of time on social media. An estimated 44.4 per cent students indicated that they spend more than two hours daily on social media, followed by those who spend roughly two hours (25.4 per cent). In other words, almost 70 per cent of all respondents spend at least two hours every day on social media activities. This finding indicates the importance of social media for daily routines of students, confirming existing evidence that social media increasingly claim more of people's free time (Fuchs 2014; Bantimaroudis 2016). Furthermore, a significant number of students indicated that they believe in conspiracy theories. Four main variables provide an index of students attributing value to conspiracy theories: specifically, their belief in 'chemtrails' (a conspiracy theory claiming that sinister governments keep populations subdued through dropping toxic substances on them); the 9/11 conspiracy theory (which expresses the belief that the 9/11 terrorist attack was planned and executed by the US government); the 'cancer cure' conspiracy (which claims that cure for cancer is withheld from people to protect the financial interests of major pharmaceutical corporations); and finally, a vaccine-related conspiracy (which claims that vaccines are dangerous because pharmaceutical companies lie about their side effects). Our descriptive evidence reveals that students' beliefs in conspiracy theories vary, as their level of agreement shows significant fluctuations from theory to theory. Table 1 shows evidence of agreement recorded on a scale from 1 to 7. Those who indicated a level of agreement from 5 to 7 indicated the strongest agreement with the aforementioned conspiracy theories. Students showed their strongest agreement for the 'cancer cure' conspiracy (50.5 per cent) followed by the 9/11 case (41.1 per cent), the vaccination issue (23.7 per cent) and the 'chemtrails' scenario (15.8 per cent).

As we generated descriptive evidence, we evaluated the question of trust in social media, in contrast to trust in mainstream mass media. Our descriptive analysis yielded some interesting results. The overwhelming majority of students (79.4 per cent) believe that 'mainstream media lie'. Only 18.4 per cent of students were neutral, while a small minority (2.2 per cent) disagreed with the statement. Similarly, when students were asked whether they perceived mainstream media as reliable, 15.7 per cent responded 'more than social media'. However, most students (50.9 per cent) responded 'the same as social media', while 33.3 per cent responded 'less than social media'. Both variables indicate that students display more trust in alternative 'news' sources, while clearly displaying their distrust of traditional mass-media outlets. Along the same lines, when asked 'do you trust social media', 33.1 per cent of students indicated 'more than mass media', 45.9 per cent said 'the same as mass media', while 21 per cent responded 'less than mass media'. We also show the different distribution of student's agreement with conspiratorial beliefs based on their levels of income by comparing the low-income and high-income families. It is evident that low-income students are distributed at the centre of the graph (Figure 1) while for high-income students the observations are clustered at the left of the distribution, suggesting low levels of agreement.

One of the fundamental assumptions of the current project is that social media are considered more trustworthy and reliable than mainstream mass-media sources. An additional assumption of our current exploration is that students seek to participate in social discussions about conspiracy theories. Of

| <b>Chemtrails</b> | <b>9/11 attack</b> | <b>Vaccines</b> | <b>Cancer cure</b> |
|-------------------|--------------------|-----------------|--------------------|
| 15.8%             | 41.1%              | 23.7%           | 50.5%              |
| M=2.61            | M=3.99             | M=3.20          | M=4.34             |
| SD=1.82           | SD=1.96            | SD=1.75         | SD=2.13            |

Table 1: Students believing in conspiracy theories (N=476).

the students surveyed, more than one-third indicated that they participate in at least one type of discussion of a conspiratorial nature. Our regression analysis was designed on the premise that social media group discussions with a strong emphasis on conspiracies should be treated as the primary independent variables while various other factors should be scrutinized as additional control variables. Table 2 includes the full model, while in Table 3, we re-estimated the regression by keeping only the significant variables. In both tables, we present both the odds ratio and the marginal effects of the independent variables. The marginal effect of an independent variable is the partial derivative of a given function of this variable. In our analysis, it is the change in probability of believing in conspiratorial beliefs if one particular independent variable changes by a unit. Thereby, in the first entry, the odds ratio of 1.363 means that there is an 36.3 per cent increase in odds for the gender variable compared with its reference category, while there is a 7.7 per cent higher probability for gender differences. However, the gender variable is an insignificant predictor suggesting that we cannot differentiate between male and female students in connection with their conspiratorial beliefs.

Our analysis yields some interesting findings. A high level of family income displays a reverse relationship with conspiracism, which is statistically significant at the 5 per cent level. Based on the odds ratio, there is a 23.7 per cent decrease. As family income rises, the probability of students believing in conspiracy theories decreases by 6.7 per cent. Thereby, the richer a student's family is, the lower the probability that the student has conspiratorial beliefs. The differences that accrue in connection with the parents' educational background are also worth discussing. We observe that the variable capturing mother's education is reversely correlated and significant even at low levels of education. On the other hand, we observe that the low educational level of father is positively associated with conspiracy beliefs and this association is reversed as the level of father's education increases. However, the education of the father is never statistically significant. A student's fear of losing a job displays some interesting information as well. As a student is more afraid of a sudden loss of her or his job, the likelihood of believing in conspiracies increases.

Students who believe that mainstream media would lie are also more likely to believe in conspiracy theories, while for students that feel citizens of Europe, we observe an aversion towards these beliefs. Both results are statistically significant. The variables capturing students' participation in social media discussion groups are of primary interest. Of the four different thematic groups, only two are statistically significant. Individuals who participate in discussion groups with an interest in the chemtrail issue have a higher probability of adopting conspiratorial beliefs by 16.1 per cent at the 10 per cent significance level. Discussing the cancer cure conspiracy is linked to a higher probability of subscribing to conspiracism by 19.7 per cent at the 1 per cent significance level.




Figure 1: Student’s agreement with conspiratorial beliefs based on their income.

The Pseudo *R*-square measure is relatively low (0.163), but based on the Likelihood Ratio test (94.49), we reject the null hypothesis that all predictors are jointly insignificant in favour of our model. We also present the plotting of the marginal effects for this specification along with their confidence intervals at the 95 per cent significance level (Figure 2). In the appendix, we include a regression where we add dummies for universities. Due to the small sample size, we are not able to estimate regression for each university separately. Hence, university dummies will show whether there are any differences between the universities in our sample. The two thematic group discussions remain statistically significant. Regarding the university dummies, we observe that only students from the University of Sheffield (UK) face lower odds in believing in conspiracy theories and the probability is almost 31 per cent.

DISCUSSION

This exploratory study yields some interesting findings related to social media interactions and conspiracy theories. It shows that a significant number of students, representing a generation of millennial media users, treat certain conspiracy theories as a valid framework through which they make sense of the world. Furthermore, they are active seekers of content with the aim of participating in thematic social media discussions. This finding is indicative of agenda melding effects as students report their active participation in communities that promote their individual interests.

The results are consistent with a recent national survey in Greece showing, for example, that 26.5 per cent of respondents believed that the emissions of airliners visible in the sky are ‘chemtrails’ of substances dropped on unsuspecting populations by unnamed conspiracists (Dianeosis 2015). Though this figure does not constitute the majority or the mainstream of the Greek society cannot be considered as negligible either. This national public opinion poll converges with our student survey, documenting the degree of acceptance of conspiracism as an interpretive mechanism. Data indicate that conspiracism

| Independent variables            | Odds ratio | z-Stat | Marginal effects | z-Stat |
|----------------------------------|------------|--------|------------------|--------|
| Gender                           | 1.363      | 1.42   | 0.077            | 1.42   |
| Family income                    | 0.763**    | -2.24  | -0.067**         | -2.24  |
| Father's educ. (ref. elementary) |            |        |                  |        |
| High school                      | 1.399      | 0.65   | 0.083            | 0.66   |
| University or college            | 1.298      | 0.52   | 0.064            | 0.53   |
| Master's                         | 0.946      | -0.09  | -0.013           | -0.09  |
| Ph.D.                            | -0.576     | -0.49  | -0.126           | -0.52  |
| Other                            | 2.799      | 1.33   | 0.250            | 1.40   |
| Mother's educ. (ref. elementary) |            |        |                  |        |
| High school                      | 0.101***   | -3.61  | -0.514***        | -4.60  |
| University or college            | 0.269**    | -2.29  | -0.286***        | -2.91  |
| Master's                         | 0.244*     | -1.87  | -0.310**         | -2.01  |
| Ph.D.                            | 0.079*     | -1.78  | -0.560**         | -2.23  |
| Other                            | 0.084***   | -2.94  | -0.548***        | -3.69  |
| Fear of losing job               | 1.068*     | 1.70   | 0.017*           | 1.70   |
| Feeling as a citizen of Europe   | 0.807**    | -1.98  | -0.053**         | -1.98  |
| Mainstream media lie             | 1.805***   | 3.84   | 0.147***         | 3.84   |
| Discussions about chemtrails     | 1.911*     | 1.71   | 0.161*           | 1.71   |
| Discussions about vaccinations   | 0.865      | -0.39  | -0.036           | -0.39  |
| Discussions about 9/11           | 1.378      | 1.09   | 0.080            | 1.09   |
| Discussions about cancer         | 2.207***   | 3.28   | 0.197***         | 3.28   |
| Number of observations           | 476        |        |                  |        |

Note: All predictors at their mean value. Marginal effect for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level. Marginal effects were calculated using the Delta method of Stata 15.

\*\*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \* $p < 0.1$ .

Table 2: *Logistic regression and predicted probabilities of believing in conspiratorial beliefs (full model specification).*

cannot be traced only in small, marginal groups with particular demographic traits, but it seems to be gaining ground in larger segments of society, like the population of millennials. This finding merits our attention, as it indicates that subcultural discourses of a conspiratorial nature remained in contexts of minority interest, and now they move towards the mainstream of public discourse, including university environments. Our sample indicates that a significant number of students display an interest in these areas of public inquiry.

However, the four conspiracy theories under scrutiny are not equally appealing and even when they seem to be popular among students they don't display the same influence on conspiratorial beliefs. It seems that certain health-related topics such as the 'cancer cure' issue are very popular, while influencing students' conspiratorial tendencies. If the 'chemtrails' notion can be linked to health-related concerns, then arguably health-related conspiracies

| Independent variables            | Odds ratio | z-Stat | Marginal effects | z-Stat |
|----------------------------------|------------|--------|------------------|--------|
| Family income                    | 0.747**    | -2.50  | -0.073**         | -2.50  |
| Mother's educ. (ref. elementary) |            |        |                  |        |
| High school                      | 0.111***   | -3.89  | -0.497***        | -4.79  |
| University or college            | 0.299***   | -2.60  | -0.266***        | -3.21  |
| Master's                         | 0.232**    | -2.20  | -0.329**         | -2.31  |
| Ph.D.                            | 0.066**    | -2.16  | -0.589***        | -3.02  |
| Other                            | 0.125***   | -2.72  | -0.472***        | -3.11  |
| Fear of losing job               | 1.070*     | 1.78   | 0.0169*          | 1.78   |
| Feeling as a citizen of Europe   | 0.827*     | -1.79  | -0.047*          | -1.79  |
| Mainstream media lie             | 1.759***   | 3.68   | 0.141***         | 3.68   |
| Discussions about chemtrails     | 1.756      | 1.57   | 0.140            | 1.57   |
| Discussions about cancer         | 2.453***   | 3.90   | 0.224***         | 3.90   |
| Number of observations           | 476        |        |                  |        |

Note: All predictors at their mean value. Marginal effect for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level. Marginal effects were calculated using the Delta method of Stata 15.

\*\*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \* $p < 0.1$ .

Table 3: Logistic regression and predicted probabilities of believing in conspiratorial beliefs (only significant predictors).

have become the subject of social media discussions because people worry about health-related effects. Surprisingly, students' discussions about vaccinations did not influence their beliefs as this particular relationship did not register as significant. We believe that this finding would resonate better with parents caring for young children. So arguably this finding does not apply to this particular segment in a pronounced manner.

This study demonstrates that students consider social media communities as credible and trustworthy sources, as they engage in news- and information-seeking activities. The vast majority of our sample trust social media more than mass media or, at least, they consider both equally credible. Only a minority of students indicated that they trust mass media more than social media. It is evident that social media platforms function as 'news' gatekeepers and information providers. This descriptive finding shows that students might trust other individuals with similar beliefs more than they trust professional journalists and mainstream media. This particular finding can be linked with journalistic transformations and students' definitions of 'news' in social media settings.

What are the implications of this finding? It is very likely that students seek validation of their pre-existing beliefs in social media communities. Although these findings merit additional attention, the present study documents a relatively strong relationship between individual beliefs and social media interactions with like-minded individuals. The study shows that individuals converge at different levels and with varying intensity, while moderating factors (such as fear, income and the educational level of their mother) explain increased




Figure 2: Plot of the significant marginal effects (95 per cent confidence intervals).

melding with social media groups. Fear registers as a significant moderating factor related to conspiracism. As the literature indicates, fearful personalities interacting with like-minded individuals can adopt distorted views of the world, leading to interpretations that cannot be supported empirically. Although this finding can be linked to Cantril's research on mass hysteria, it merits additional attention in current social conditions. How can we explain students' fearful dispositions? Is fear a personality trait? Are students responding to news spreading messages of fear? Or is fear a trait of those social media groups that students interact with? Additional research is necessary to unravel the role of fear in agenda melding processes.

The present study is indicative of changing patterns of 'news' acquisition and group interaction with digital content. Social media groups or communities become significant social structures in which individuals develop nebulous understandings of social phenomena. The present study does not explain the dynamics of information flow or segmented gatekeeping practices. It recognizes, however, that many students, despite their access to scientific methodologies and empirical data, choose to expose themselves to subcultural influences in social media environments.

Finally, this study indicates cultural shifts among young students in the context of European politics. The current evidence should be viewed in the context of a changing Europe with an atmosphere of fear being prevalent in media discourses. Thereby we need to assess the roles of new interpretive mechanisms that young Europeans resort to in order to understand their Europe.

Despite the methodological precautions we have undertaken, this study is subject to limitations. Although we invited participants from different European countries, our sample is not randomly selected, and thereby our results are not generalizable in the strict sense. The sample size of the survey



itself poses a limitation and we cannot account for differences between countries and/or universities.

Furthermore, despite the similarities we have observed across our national subgroups, we do not assume that millennial segments display similar characteristics everywhere. Our research relied on available participants, which might have influenced the degree of similarity in our sample. We acknowledge those possibilities, and therefore future research on conspiracism should scrutinize larger, randomly selected samples of media users while assessing segmented traits, along with socio-economic and cultural dispositions across Europe. As we already discussed in the literature, future research should examine closely the relationship between mainstream media and social media platforms as melding processes might involve content fluidity across hybrid media platforms. Expanding this inquiry beyond millennial and postmillennial segments should shed additional light in the context of societal perceptions and behaviours. Clearly, conspiracism should be subject to scientific scrutiny even as a minority phenomenon because user perceptions of social problems affect the very essence and the functions of modern democracies.

The evidence presented in this article can provide insights and the basis for further research in this field aimed at bringing forward additional knowledge that explains this current predilection towards what was once known as marginal, subcultural and unfounded. Furthermore, new theories are necessary to unravel the potential repercussions of fake news, conspiratorial and pseudo-scientific content as they gain ground in liberal, democratic contexts and especially in the minds of young thinkers and future scientists in Europe.

## **APPENDIX 1: QUESTIONNAIRE**

### ***Profile variables***

The questions that students answered provided evidence for the following characteristics of the sample:

#### *Gender*

A nominal scale, demographic variable.

#### *Parents' level of education*

A categorical variable separating students' parents in terms of their level of education.

#### *Nationality*

A nominal scale variable with four categories: Greek, Cypriot, British and other.

#### *Income*

An ordinal scale variable measured income at the following levels in Euros or British Pounds: (1) Up to 10,000, (2) from 10,001 to 30,000, (3) from 30,001 to 50,000 and (4) over 50,000.

## ***Participation, attitudes and beliefs variables***

### *Political orientation*

This variable has the following categories: Far left, left, centre, right and far right.

### *Feeling as a citizen of the European Union*

This variable has the following categories: (1) yes absolutely, (2) yes, to some extent, (3) neutral, (4) not really and (5) definitely not.

### *National pride*

This variable has the following categories: (1) very proud, (2) moderately proud, (3) neutral, (4) not very proud and (5) not proud at all.

### *Fear of losing one's job*

These questions are related to perceived levels of fear because of job insecurity. This variable is measured on a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 indicates that a person is not fearful at all and 10 represents a maximum level of fear. The scale chosen is similar to the Eurobarometer survey conducted every year by the European Commission.

### *Time spent on social media every day*

This variable has the following categories: (1) up to 15 minutes, (2) up to 30 minutes, (3) up to one hour, (4) up to two hours and (5) more than two hours.

### *Social media concerns*

Respondents provided a yes/no answer to the following question: Do you have any concerns about the use of social media?

### *Participation in social media groups/communities*

Respondents provided a 'yes/no' answer to the following question: Do you participate in a group or community that is active in the context of social media?

### *Participation in political discussions*

Respondents provided a yes/no/rarely answer to the following question: Do you participate in political discussions?

### *Trust in mainstream media*

Students responded to the following question: Do you believe that mainstream media lie? This variable has the following categories: (1) yes, absolutely, (2) yes, to a point, (3) neutral, (4) probably not and (5) definitely not.

### *Reliability of mainstream media*

Students responded to the following question: Do you believe that mainstream media are reliable? This variable has the following categories: (1) more than social media, (2) the same as social media and (3) less than social media.

### *Trust in social media*

Students responded to the following question: Do you trust social media? This variable has the following categories: (1) more than mainstream media, (2) the same as mainstream media and (3) less than mainstream media.

### *Social media – thematic discussions*

Students responded to the following statements with a yes/no answer:

1. 'Citizens are sprayed with toxic substances from airplanes so that they don't react'.
2. 'Vaccinations are dangerous because pharmaceutical companies lie'.
3. 'The September 11, 2001, attacks against New York City were organized internally by the United States Government for its own purposes'.
4. 'The drug that cures cancer has been discovered, but they do not release it because of profitability concerns'.

### *Conspiracism*

Students responded to the following statements on a scale from 1 to 7, where 7 means absolute agreement and 1 means absolute disagreement.

1. 'Citizens are sprayed with toxic substances from airplanes so that they don't react'.
2. 'Vaccinations are dangerous because pharmaceutical companies lie'.
3. 'The September 11, 2001, attacks against New York City were organized internally by the United States Government for its own purposes'.
4. 'The drug that cures cancer has been discovered, but they do not release it because of profitability concerns'.

## APPENDIX 2

| Independent variables            | Odds ratio | z-Stat | Marginal effects | z-Stat |
|----------------------------------|------------|--------|------------------|--------|
| Gender                           | 1.336      | 1.30   | 0.072            | 1.30   |
| Family income                    | 0.906      | -0.74  | -0.024           | -0.74  |
| Father's educ. (ref. elementary) |            |        |                  |        |
| High school                      | 1.994      | 1.34   | 0.170            | 1.38   |
| University or college            | 1.462      | 0.77   | 0.093            | 0.79   |
| Master's                         | 1.057      | 0.09   | 0.013            | 0.09   |
| Ph.D.                            | 0.626      | -0.42  | -0.103           | -0.44  |
| Other                            | 2.898      | 1.40   | 0.260            | 1.47   |
| Mother's educ. (ref. elementary) |            |        |                  |        |
| High school                      | 0.150***   | -2.93  | -0.432***        | -3.52  |
| University or college            | 0.269**    | -2.21  | -0.291***        | -2.77  |
| Master's                         | 0.215**    | -1.97  | -0.347**         | -2.15  |
| Ph.D.                            | 0.072*     | -1.71  | -0.575**         | -2.28  |
| Other                            | 0.080***   | -3.04  | -0.559***        | -3.91  |
| Fear of losing job               | 1.049      | 1.22   | 0.012            | 1.22   |
| Feeling as a citizen of Europe   | 0.802**    | -1.97  | -0.055**         | -1.97  |
| Mainstream media lie             | 1.805***   | 3.89   | 0.147***         | 3.89   |
| Discussions about chemtrails     | 1.943*     | 1.77   | 0.166*           | 1.77   |
| Discussions about vaccinations   | 0.925      | -0.21  | -0.019           | -0.21  |
| Discussions about 9/11           | 1.392      | 1.11   | 0.082            | 1.11   |
| Discussions about cancer         | 2.110***   | 3.08   | 0.186***         | 3.08   |
| Lesvos                           |            |        |                  |        |
| Thessaloniki                     | 0.742      | -1.18  | -0.074           | -1.18  |
| Sheffield                        | 0.256***   | -3.04  | -0.308***        | -3.59  |
| Cyprus                           | 1.176      | 0.51   | 0.039            | 0.51   |
| Number of observations           | 476        |        |                  |        |

Note: All predictors at their mean value. Marginal effect for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level. Marginal effects were calculated using the Delta method of Stata 15.

\*\*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \* $p < 0.1$ .

Table 4: Logistic regression and predicted probabilities of believing in conspiratorial beliefs (model including university dummies).

## APPENDIX 3

From the correlation matrix, it is evident that all of our independent variables are significantly correlated with the dependent variable (Agreement with Conspiratorial Beliefs) with the only exception being 'Gender', where no differences are observed between female and male students. Another interesting observation is that the correlations among independent variables are low, while in many cases, correlations are insignificant. This finding suggests the lack of multicollinearity between our independent variables and hence, standard errors have been properly estimated.

| Variables  | (1)              | (2)              | (3)              | (4)              | (5)              | (6)              | (7)              | (8)              | (9)             | (10)            | (11)            | (12)  |
|--|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-------|
| (1) Agreement with conspiratorial beliefs                      | 1.000            |                  |                  |                  |                  |                  |                  |                  |                 |                 |                 |       |
| (2) Gender   | 0.048<br>(0.29)  | 1.000            |                  |                  |                  |                  |                  |                  |                 |                 |                 |       |
| (3) Family income  | -0.193<br>(0.00) | -0.074<br>(0.11) | 1.000            |                  |                  |                  |                  |                  |                 |                 |                 |       |
| (4) Education level of student's father                        | -0.184<br>(0.00) | -0.049<br>(0.29) | 0.363<br>(0.00)  | 1.000            |                  |                  |                  |                  |                 |                 |                 |       |
| (5) Education level of student's mother                        | -0.167<br>(0.00) | -0.061<br>(0.18) | 0.336<br>(0.00)  | 0.558<br>(0.00)  | 1.000            |                  |                  |                  |                 |                 |                 |       |
| (6) Student's fear of losing job                               | 0.152<br>(0.00)  | 0.074<br>(0.11)  | -0.139<br>(0.00) | -0.133<br>(0.00) | -0.196<br>(0.00) | 1.000            |                  |                  |                 |                 |                 |       |
| (7) Student's feeling as a citizen of Europe                   | 0.161<br>(0.00)  | -0.148<br>(0.00) | -0.119<br>(0.01) | -0.103<br>(0.02) | -0.040<br>(0.38) | 0.062<br>(0.17)  | 1.000            |                  |                 |                 |                 |       |
| (8) Do you believe that mainstream media lie?                  | -0.220<br>(0.00) | 0.089<br>(0.05)  | 0.016<br>(0.73)  | 0.113<br>(0.01)  | 0.020<br>(0.67)  | -0.108<br>(0.02) | -0.164<br>(0.00) | 1.000            |                 |                 |                 |       |
| (9) Student's participation in discussions about chemtrails    | 0.179<br>(0.00)  | -0.088<br>(0.05) | -0.025<br>(0.58) | -0.053<br>(0.25) | 0.024<br>(0.60)  | 0.078<br>(0.09)  | 0.054<br>(0.24)  | -0.093<br>(0.04) | 1.000           |                 |                 |       |
| (10) Student's participation in discussions about vaccinations | 0.081<br>(0.07)  | -0.009<br>(0.84) | -0.047<br>(0.31) | -0.045<br>(0.33) | -0.018<br>(0.69) | -0.010<br>(0.83) | 0.059<br>(0.20)  | -0.026<br>(0.57) | 0.414<br>(0.00) | 1.000           |                 |       |
| (11) Student's participation in discussions about 9/11         | 0.159<br>(0.00)  | -0.060<br>(0.19) | -0.052<br>(0.26) | -0.001<br>(0.98) | 0.004<br>(0.94)  | -0.018<br>(0.70) | 0.071<br>(0.12)  | -0.121<br>(0.01) | 0.325<br>(0.00) | 0.339<br>(0.00) | 1.000           |       |
| (12) Student's participation in discussions about cancer       | 0.268<br>(0.00)  | 0.084<br>(0.07)  | -0.131<br>(0.00) | -0.094<br>(0.04) | -0.024<br>(0.60) | 0.080<br>(0.08)  | 0.068<br>(0.14)  | -0.104<br>(0.02) | 0.368<br>(0.00) | 0.247<br>(0.00) | 0.343<br>(0.00) | 1.000 |

*Note:* *p*-Values in parentheses.

*Table 5: Correlation matrix.*

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